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In late June 2009, a slim majority of the U.S. House of Representatives
enacted the American Clean Energy and Security Act, a 1427 page bill
finalized on the morning of the House vote.' This legislation was rushed to
a rapid vote in the House in order to give momentum to the U.S. Senate's
effort to finalize a climate law before the December 2009 United Nations
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. At the moment that this
article is being written in late November 2009, the accelerated
parliamentary practices used in the House seems to have gone for naught as
the Senate has yet to take up the behemoth legislation.
One by-product of the backroom procedures used in the House was
that the final measure included a hastily-written requirement that importers
purchase allowances beginning in 2020. The import charge was quickly
criticized by President Barack Obama as unnecessary,2 and by many trade
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Washington, D.C. This article is based on a presentation given on October 23, 2009 at the International
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1. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. (2009).
2. Steven Mufson, Obama Praises Climate Bill's Progress But Opposes Its Tariffs, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2009, at A5 [hereinafter Mufson].
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law experts on the grounds that such measures would violate World Trade
Organization (WTO) law.3 The main target country governments, India and
China, have vociferously complained that the threatened U.S. action,
sometimes called a "carbon tariff," is protectionist and violates rules in the
WTO's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).4 In this article, I
will use the term "carbon charge" rather than "carbon tariff," because the
measure in the House bill is technically a charge, rather than a tariff.
The House-approved bill imposes a cap-and-trade form of regulation on
covered entities with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
in 2012 to seventeen percent below the 2005 levels.5 Agricultural
emissions are not regulated. The bill provides for large, temporary, free
grants of emission allowances to polluting businesses.6 Eligibility for these
subsidies is determined by a formula including factors such as energy, GHG
intensity, and trade intensity of each covered sector. According to the
House bill, this program is designed to help "trade vulnerable industries."7
Although the U.S. House of Representatives is the only legislative body to
approve carbon charges, many parliamentary bodies, for example in Europe
and Australia, have agreed to free emission allowances.
The import provisions in the House bill are complex, and can only be
briefly summarized here. The purpose of requiring importers to purchase
an international reserve allowance from the U.S. government is to minimize
the likelihood of "carbon leakage" as a result of differences between the
cost of compliance in the United States and the costs in other countries.
3. See, e.g., Zack Hale, Democrats Try to Walk Fine Line on Tariffs, NAT'L J., July 8, 2009,
available at http://www.nationaljoumal.com/njonline/no_20090708_2274.php (last visited Mar. 3,
2010); Dina Cappiello, UN Climate Expert Warns Against Carbon Tariffs, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN.
WIRE, July 22, 2009; Michael A. Levi, The Dangers of a Carbon Trade War, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12,
2009, at 13; Alan Oxley, Bill Could Create a Trade War, ROLL CALL, Nov. 9, 2009; Cooling the planet
without chilling trade, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2009, at AI9; Aaditya Mattoo, Arvind Subramanian,
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe & Jianwu He, Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy at 16,
(Center for Global Dev., 2009). A large literature written before June 2009 analyzes policy proposals
for carbon charges and similar measures. See, e.g., TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., LEVELING THE CARBON
PLAYING FIELD (2008); ERICH VRANES, Climate Protection and WTO Law, in TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 373-95 (2009); Paul-Erik Veel, Carbon Tariffs and the WTO: An Evaluation of
Feasible Policies, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 749 (2009) [hereinafter Veel].
4. See Veel, supra note 3. Trade Issues Come to the Fore in Climate Talks, 13 BRIDGES
WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 30, Sept. 9, 2009, at 2-3, available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/54721/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); David Stanway & Wang Lan,
Carbon Tariff Proposals Unworkable: China WTO Rep, REUTERS, Oct. 29, 2009.
5. Mufson, supra note 2.
6. Although some auctions of emission allowances would begin in the early years of
implementation of the House bill, at least eighty percent of the allowances would be granted freely to
polluters in the initial years of the program.
7. H.R. 2454 § 782 (e).
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The bill defines "carbon leakage" as "any substantial increase in greenhouse
gas emissions . . . in other countries if such increase is caused by an
incremental cost of production increase in the United States resulting
from.. ." the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.8 The
imposition of this import charge would be triggered by specified findings
that are both country and sector specific.
The bill does not have an integrated section on exports; instead,
exports are addressed in several provisions. For example, in the rules for
ozone-depleting substances, there is a provision for a refund of an
allowance upon export. In the rules on obtaining emission allowances, the
bill exempts the export of certain fuel, coke natural gas, and other
chemicals. Otherwise, the House bill does not provide a rebate for an
export of a good for which the producer purchases an emission allowance.
As I am already on record regarding whether climate-related
import charges and subsidies are consistent with WTO law, 9 this article
will cover a different issue. That is, whether the proposed carbon charges
and emission allowance subsidies are consistent with international
environmental law and principles. My analysis will include:
1) hard-law in the form of customary or conventional
international environmental law,
2) soft-law,
3) non-binding principles propounded by governments to
guide governmental measures.
I recognize that I may be engendering confusion by conflating
different sources of law and lumping together law and non-law, but I do so
for two reasons. First, with respect to the environment, the dividing line
between legal norms and non-legal principles remains contested. 1o Second,
the "hard" environmental law is often too general to say anything about the
environmental appropriateness of the contested U.S. trade provisions. By
contrast, some of the "soft" principles are directly on point and ought to be
8. Id. § 762.
9. See Steve Charnovitz, America's New Climate Unilateralism, 23 INT'L ECON. MAG. 4, Fall
2009, at 50-52, available at http://www.international-economy.com/TIEF09 Charnovitz.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
10. See generally Ulrich Beyerlin, Different Types of Norms in International Environmental
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 425-48 (Daniel Bodansky
et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Beyerlin]; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Formation of Customary International
Law and General Principles, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
449-66 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2009).
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emphasized more in the ongoing international debate about carbon charges
and free allowances.
The aim of this article is to fill a gap in the literature on trade and
climate. Although some of the international environmental law to be
analyzed here, for example the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), is discussed frequently, other environmental principles
covered here have largely been left out of the ongoing debate. Relatedly,
although I am aware of a cornucopia of legal literature on how trade rules
and principles apply to climate-related trade measures, I am unaware of any
article examining how environmental rules and principles apply to such
measures.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I articulates the conceptual
bases for trade-related climate measures. Part II summarizes the key
international environmental principles most relevant to an evaluation of the
carbon charges and free allowances in the House bill. This part will also
briefly discuss the normativity of these provisions. Part III applies these
environmental norms and principles to the House bill and, in particular,
examines the free allowances and carbon import charges. Part IV concludes
the analysis.
I. CONCEPTUAL BASES FOR TRADE-RELATED CLIMATE MEASURES
If there was only one government on the planet, no rationale would
exist for trade-related climate measures. Thus, it is the asymmetry between
the global commons and national regulatory authority that may make it
difficult to obtain coherent and effective environmental regulation to
control climate change. l1 The experience in the climate regime over the
past twenty years has shown that many countries, most notably the United
States, can drag the regime down through free-riding behavior. Moreover,
experience has shown that even if countries formally agree to regulate in the
same way, there can still be substantial problems of non-compliance, as
there is in the WTO and in many environmental regimes. Looking ahead to
2050, the challenge of obtaining coherence will be even greater because
eighty percent in the baseline growth in GHG emissions will occur in
developing countries.
One of the greatest challenges in obtaining cooperation is equity. The
developing countries, like India and China, quite rightly point out that
burden-sharing formulas in the climate regime need to take into account the
historical responsibility for GHG emissions by the industrial countries.
There is also a significant issue of intergenerational equity, namely, how
11. See Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1495,
1535-36(1999).
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much mitigation should occur now even though technological
improvements may make mitigation less expensive in the future.
The problems of coherence and equity exist with or without
transborder investment and trade. But when one takes into account
transborder investment, additional challenges arise. The challenge of
"leakage" is the one most discussed. The concern is that if the price of
carbon differs among countries, investment and production will move from
a high-regulation country in the international regime to a low-regulation
country outside of the regime, and thereby undermine the benefits of the
emission reductions agreed to within the regime. Leakage is
distinguishable from the traditional concern about "polluter havens," where
only low-regulation countries would suffer more pollution and high-
regulation countries would not necessarily suffer more pollution.
Although the concept of climate leakage is conceptually sound, the
significance of leakage has been questioned. For example, Angel Gurria,
the Secretary General of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) recently pointed to estimates of a leakage rate of just
two percent by 2050 if all industrialized countries take action to reduce
emissions. 12 Note that this low number does not mean that the growth of
developing countries' emissions does not threaten to undermine the
coherence of the climate regime. The low number only reflects the
emissions associated with the movement of production from high-
regulation to low-regulation countries. The climate regime would still be
incoherent and ineffective if large emitting countries do not agree to
absolute reductions in their emissions. So far, India and China have not
agreed to do so.13
Although leakage is typically characterized as being bad, one should
recall that leakage can be efficient if GHG-intensive production moves to
another country where the same goods can be produced in a more carbon
friendly way, for example, with hydropower. 14
Taking into account cross-border trade adds another layer of
complexity to the design of a climate regime. The central problem is how
to allocate responsibility for goods that move in international trade. Should
the producing economy be responsible for the emissions entailed in the
production and transportation of exported goods, or should that be the
12. Angel Gurria, Carbon Has No Place in Global Trade Rules, FIN. TIMES U.K., Nov. 4,
2009, at A9.
13. Kimberley Strassel, Cap and Trade Is Dead, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2009, at A19 (stating
that "China and India are clear they won't join the West in an economic suicide pact").
14. This point was made by Laura Campbell at the International Law Weekend panel session
on trade and climate change.
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responsibility of the importing, consuming country? A surprisingly small
amount of attention has been devoted to that conundrum. Instead, the trade
focus on climate change is about the economic effects on domestic
producers of importing goods produced in another country under lower
environmental regulations and with lower costs of carbon. The economic
effect feared is lost jobs, at least in the short run. This is termed the
"competitiveness" problem and the need for a level playing field.
II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRINCIPLES
The sources of environmental law and principles are custom, treaties,
soft-law, and non-binding declarations. Many of these emanate from the
environmental regime, but as I will note below, some of them emanate from
the trade regime.
A. Custom15
As Ulrich Beyerlin has noted, the principle that states should not cause
transboundary environmental damage is recognized as a rule of universal
customary law. 16 This rule is restated in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development in the following way:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and developmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 7
15. Although I have noted this above, it bear repeating here that the only environmental
norms and principles covered in this article are those that I consider to be relevant to an assessment of
whether carbon charges and subsidies can be justified on environmental grounds. Space constraints
prevent me from justifying why I have omitted specific norms such as the precautionary principle,
environmental impact assessment, and sustainable development.
16. Beyerlin, supra note 10, at 439.
17. U.N. Conf. on Env. & Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development]. See also Ved P. Nanda, International Environmental Norms Applicable to Nuclear
Activities, with Particular Focus on Decisions of International Tribunals and International Settlements,
35 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 53-54 (2006) (discussing the history of this provision going back to
the Stockholm Convention).
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Although a transboundary impact can also be a global impact, the law
of transboundary impact was traditionally focused on the exclusive impact
on particular, often nearby, countries, rather than global effects.'8  The
normativity of customary international law notionally is that it expresses an
obligation on all states.
B. Treaties
Treaties (or conventions) express obligations that states voluntarily
incur by ratifying a treaty. A state that does not ratify a treaty has no
obligations under that treaty. The most important treaty law respecting
climate for which the United States is bound is the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change.' 9 Article 4 (Commitments) states that:
All Parties, taking into account their common but
differentiated responsibilities and their specific national
and regional development priorities, objectives and
circumstances, shall: . . . [tiake climate change
considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their
relevant social, economic and environmental policies and
actions, and employ appropriate methods, for example
impact assessments, formulated and determined
nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse effects on
the economy, on public health and on the quality of the
environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them
to mitigate or adapt to climate change.20
This provision enshrines the principle of "common but differentiated
responsibilities ' '2' for climate policymaking and puts forward a goal of
minimizing the adverse effects on an economy of measures to mitigate or
adapt to climate change.
18. See Gunther Handl, Transboundary Impacts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 531-32 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2009). Handl notes that
"the basic rules regarding transboundary state-to-state impacts may also apply to transboundary impacts
of the global effects/global commons category." Id. at 532. See also PHOEBE N. OKOWA, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10 (2000).
19. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
20. Id. art. 4 sec. (1)(f).
21. Id. art. 3 sec. (1).
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Another treaty with relevant environmental norms is the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).22 Although
the WTO Agreement is often not considered part of international
environmental law, the jurisprudence of the WTO makes clear that besides
its trade objectives, the WTO also propounds non-trade objectives,
including environmental protection. This was explained in the compliance
panel decision in U.S.-Shrimp case, when the WTO panel declared that
23
sustainable development is one of the objectives of the WTO Agreement.
The WTO judiciary has not had occasion to issue detailed holdings on
the obligations of WTO member governments with respect to the
environment and public health, but some norms have fructified. For
example in the U.S.-Shrimp case, the highest court of the WTO, the
Appellate Body, suggested that sovereign states "should and do" act
"together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO
or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise
protect the environment., 24 In the earlier EC-Hormones case, the Appellate
Body noted that there was not only a right, but also a "duty of [WTO]
Members to protect the life and health of their people. 25
C. Soft-law
I stand with Dinah Shelton in using the term "soft-law" to refer to
"hortatory or promotional language of certain treaty provisions than for
instruments concluded in non-binding form." 26  Soft-law of this type is
22. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
23. Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
7.42, 9.1, WT/DS58/R (adopted May 15, 1998). Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Keynote
Address at the Carleton University: Climate First, Trade Second-GATTzilla is Long Gone (Nov. 2,
2009) (stating that "the creators of the WTO [had] enshrined the concept of Sustainable Development,
right in the Preamble of the WTO accord").
24. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 185, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US.-
Shrimp]. Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Keynote Address at the Yale University: The WTO
and its Agenda for Sustainable Development (Oct. 24, 2007) (stating that "the WTO showed itself
capable of delivering not only trade justice, but some measure of environmental justice too... the WTO
pushed its members towards a strengthening of their environmental collaboration. It insisted that a
cooperative environmental solution be found for the protection of sea turtles between the parties to the
conflict.")
25. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products, 177, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, EC-Hormones].
26. Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 319
(2006) [hereinafter Shelton].
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regularly used in environmental treaties. For example, Article 3 of the
UNFCCC commits parties to be guided by listed principles, including that
"[m]easures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones,
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade., 27  The Kyoto Protocol
contains detailed mitigation obligations for Annex I countries. One of the
Kyoto Protocol obligations for Annex I countries is that they "shall strive to
implement policies and measures ... in such a way as to minimize adverse
effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on
international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on
other Parties, especially developing country Parties. .. Given the use of
the word "strive," I would characterize this provision as soft-law, and note
that the Protocol is widely ratified by 184 parties.
D. Non-binding Declarations
A non-binding declaration adopted by states is not law, but as
Professor Shelton has noted, such declarations "can be effective and offer a
flexible and efficient way to order responses to common problems;" such
declarations may also lead to law.29 The three most relevant non-binding
declarations are the Environmental Principles adopted in the early 1970s by
the OECD Council. 30  The first of these Principles was enacted in May
1972, when the Council passed the "Recommendation of the Council on
Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of
Environmental Policies."3' These Principles do not apply to transfrontier
pollution.32 Among these Principles are:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution
prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of
scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in
international trade and investment is the so-called "Polluter-Pays
Principle." This principle means that the polluter should bear the
27. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3 (5).
28. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art.
2(3), Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1.
29. Shelton, supra note 26, at 320, 322.
30. See also Candice Stevens, Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and
Environment Context, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 577 (1994).
31. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of
the Council on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental
Policies, OECD Doc. C(72)128, 11 I.L.M. 1172 (May 26, 1972) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
32. Id. 1.
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expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided
by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an
acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures
should be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause
pollution in production and/or consumption. Such measures
should not be accompanied by subsidies that would create
significant distortions in international trade and investment.
33
Measures taken to protect the environment should be framed as
far as possible in such a manner as to avoid the creation of non-
tariff barriers to trade.
34
Where products are traded internationally and where there could
be significant obstacles to trade, Governments should seek
common standards for polluting products and agree on the timing
and general scope of regulations for particular products.
35
In conformity with the provisions of the GATT, measures taken
within an environmental policy, regarding polluting products,
should be applied in accordance with the principle of national
treatment (i.e. identical treatment for imported products and
similar domestic products) and with the principle of non-
discrimination (identical treatment for imported products
regardless of their national origin).36 In accordance with the
provisions of the GATT, differences in environmental policies
should not lead to the introduction of compensating import levies
or export rebates, or measures having an equivalent effect,
designed to offset the consequences of these differences on
prices. Effective implementation of the guiding principles set
forth herewith will make it unnecessary and undesirable to resort
to such measures.37
The second OECD Recommendation, enacted in 1974, is the
"Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle. ' 38 In addition to restating
points from the earlier recommendation, this Recommendation addresses
the issue of transitional government assistance for pollution control. Such
grants are to "be strictly limited" and have to comply with three conditions,
including that:
33. Id. 4.
34. Id. 99.
35. Id. 10.
36. Guiding Principles, supra note 3 1, 11.
37. Id. 13.
38. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of
the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Doc. C74(223) (Nov. 14,
1974) [hereinafter Recommendation on Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle].
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a) it should be selective and restricted to those parts of the
economy, such as industries areas or plants, where severe
difficulties would otherwise occur;
b) it should be limited to well-defined transitional periods, laid
down in advance and adapted to the specific socio-
economic problems associated with the implementation of a
country's environmental programme;
c) it should not create significant distortions in international
trade and investment.
39
The third set of OECD Principles, adopted in 1974, are the OECD
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution. 4°  Among them, the
Principle of Non-Discrimination states:
Countries should initially base their action on the principle of
non-discrimination, whereby: a) polluters causing transfrontier
pollution should be subject to legal or statutory provisions no less
severe than those which would apply for any equivalent pollution
occurring within their country, under comparable conditions and
in comparable zones, taking into account, when appropriate, the
special nature and environmental needs of the zone affected;...
c) any country whenever it applies the Polluter-Pays Principle
should apply it to all polluters within this country without making
any difference accordin to whether pollution affects this country
or another country .... 4
Because GHG emissions have both domestic and transborder effects,
all three of these OECD Principles apply to the issue of climate change.
The pioneering work of the OECD has influenced normative
developments in environmental policy. For example, Principle 16 of the
Rio Declaration states: "[n]ational authorities should endeavour to promote
the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic
instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest
39. Id. II (2).
40. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of
the Council on Principles concerning Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doc. C74(224) (Nov. 14, 1974).
Pollution is defined as "the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health harm living
resources and ecosystems, and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the
environment." Id. at title A.
41. Id. 4. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1977).
2010]
406 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
and without distorting international trade and investment. A2 Although I
have characterized the Polluter-Pays Principle as non-binding, Beyerlin
argues that it is a legal rule in the OECD.43 It should also be noted that
European law contains the environmental principle "that the polluter should
pay"44 and that a GATT panel once ruled that the Polluter-Pays Principle
was not an obligation of GATT law.45
Besides the OECD, another rich fount of relevant non-binding
environmental principles is the Rio Declaration. Principle 7 states in part:
"States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have
common but differentiated responsibilities."46
Although in this article I characterize "common but differentiated
responsibilities" as a non-binding principle, this principle, as Christopher
Stone has noted, has received considerable recognition in international
law.47 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration is another important normative
guideline and provides that:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open
international economic system that would lead to economic
growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better
address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy
measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems
should, as far as possible, be based on an international
48consensus.
42. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 17, at princ. 16.
43. Beyerlin, supra note 10, at 441. Although the OECD has the competence to legislate
binding rules, I do not view the Polluter-Pays Principle as having bindedness.
44. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 174 (2), Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C340) 3.
45. Panel Report, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances,
3.2.9, UJ6175, GATT B.I.S.D. 34S/136 (June 17, 1987).
46. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 17, at princ. 7.
47. Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276,276 (2004).
48. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 17, at princ. 12.
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In the U.S.-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body opined that Principle 12
had "particular relevance" interpretation of applicable WTO law.49
III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRINCIPLES TO HOUSE CLIMATE BILL
This part will be organized as follows: it will start with an analysis of
free emission allowances; next, carbon import charges will be examined,
and the analysis will show both arguments for and against the use of such
measures; finally, some more general issues will be considered.
A. Free Emission Allowances
Starting with hard law, one should note that the use of free allowances
is consistent with the UNFCCC obligation to employ appropriate methods
with a purpose of minimizing the adverse effects on the economy of
measures to mitigate climate change. Indeed, there could be an argument
that there is an obligation to undertake economic adjustment measures.
Moving down the hierarchy to non-binding declarations, we see that
free emission allowances are clearly in tension with the Polluter-Pays
Principle 5° because the cost of the pollution would not be internalized and
because such subsidies could create significant distortions in international
trade and investment.51  But the Principle is qualified by the
Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle
which provides for specified transition measures. In the House bill, there
are well-defined transition periods laid down in advance and adapted to the
specific socioeconomic problems associated with the implementation of the
cap-and-trade program. On the other hand, the generous House bill
provisions do not provide for a showing of "severe difficulties" and do not
contain a limiting principle to prevent significant distortion in international
trade. In addition, free allowances may violate Principle 16 of the Rio
Declaration because the polluter would not be bearing the cost of pollution
and because the large subsidies are intended to distort trade and investment
by safeguarding trade-vulnerable industries. In summary, while the more
general hard-law could justify free allowances, the more specific non-
binding principles would offer caution at least with respect to the way free
allowances are designed in the House bill.
49. Appellate Body Report, US.-Shrimp, supra note 24, 168.
50. Guiding Principles, supra note 31, 4.
51. See Jonathan R. Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 465,505 (2000).
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B. Carbon Charges at the Border
Applying the environmental law and principles to the carbon charges
in the House bill also leads to an ambiguous result, and this analysis should
start with environmental justifications for a carbon charge. The strongest
justification comes from the non-binding OECD Principles Concerning
Transfrontier Pollution which state that "polluters causing transfrontier
pollution should be subject to legal or statutory provisions no less severe
than those which would apply for any equivalent pollution occurring within
their country, under comparable conditions and in comparable zones. ' 52 As
I read it, this principle would direct the United States to apply measures
against polluters in, for example, India no less severe than against polluters
within the United States. That is the broad purpose of the House bill, but
some of the detailed provisions may be inconsistent with the "non-
discrimination" aspect of this OECD Principle. For example, the carbon
charges in the House bill are too blunt to take into account the carbon
footprints of a particular Indian product or producer.
The arguments against the proposed U.S. carbon charge are also
strong. Under the legal obligation of UNFCCC Article 4(f), U.S. policy
should take into account the "common but differentiated responsibilities" of
the other UNFCCC parties.53 For that reason, a U.S. law that holds India to
the same standard as the United States might be misapplying the vague
concept of differentiated responsibilities. Clearly, there is tension between
the OECD Principle of 1974 and the UNFCCC Principle of 1992, the latter
appears to endorse lower obligations for developing countries. A second
argument against unilateral carbon charges is the UNFCCC Article 3 which
states that "[m]easures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral
1154
ones, should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination....
This soft-law environmental principle parallels the hard-law WTO principle
in the chapeau of GATT Article XX which would deny an environmental
exception for a measure that is applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory
way.55 A third argument against the House bill is that it is directly
antithetical to the Kyoto Protocol injunction to strive to minimize adverse
effects on international trade of other parties.56 Similarly, Paragraph 9 of
52. Recommendation on Principles concerning Transfrontier Pollution, supra note 40, at para.
4.
53. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 4 (1xf).
54. Id. art. 3 (5).
55. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNovITz & JisuN KIM GLOBAL WARMING AND
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 52-60 (2009).
56. This is not hard or soft-law for the United States, but is a relevant non-binding principle
that should guide U.S. policy, particularly since the negotiating history shows that U.S. negotiators were
[Vol. 16:2
Charnovitz
the OECD Guiding Principles states that measures should be framed as far
as possible to avoid the creation of non-tariffs barriers to trade.5 7 Yet
clearly, the imposition of a new carbon charge creates a non-tariff barrier to
trade. A fourth argument comes from Paragraph 13 of the OECD Guiding
Principles which states that differences between national environmental
policies should not lead to compensating import levies designed to offset
the differences in prices.58 Because the sole purpose of the trade provisions
in the House bill is to use import levies to offset differences in prices, there
is no way to reconcile the House bill with Paragraph 13. A fifth argument
comes from the Rio Declaration agreed to by the United States in 1992 as a
non-binding principle. Principle 12 states, in part, that "[u]nilateral action
to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided."59 Given that the House bill was
passed without benefit of any multilateral negotiation, the House bill is a
unilateral action. To the extent that the House bill attempts to deal with
foreign or global environmental challenges, the House bill would seem to
be a violation of Principle 12. On the other hand, climate change, including
emissions emanating from China, is also an environmental challenge within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
So far I have analyzed the proposed United States carbon charges
under the lens of international environmental law and principles, but that is
only half of a proper analysis. It is also necessary to apply environmental
law and principles to the target countries. As Scripture says: "[j]udge not,
that ye not judged. For with that judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged, and
with that measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.' " For the
purpose of this analysis, I will use China as an example. Today, China's
position on climate change is not making any internationally-binding
commitments at Copenhagen and not making any commitments to reduce
the absolute level of its GHG emissions. Rather, China will commit only to
making legally non-enforceable pledges to reduce its carbon intensity by
forty to forty-five percent between the years 2005 and 2020.61
active in negotiating this provision, and the Kyoto Protocol was signed by the United States on Dec. 11,
1998.
57. Guiding Principles, supra note 31, 9.
58. Id. 13.
59. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 17, at princ. 12.
60. Matthew 7:1-2 (King James).
61. Fu Jing, Li Jing & Sun Xiaohua, China Targets Massive 40-45% Carbon Cut, CHINA
DAILY, Nov. 27, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-1l1/27/content_9060284.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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China's position is a violation of the customary law capsulized in
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration that pronounces a responsibility to ensure
that activities within a state's jurisdiction do not cause damage to areas
beyond its national jurisdiction. China cannot answer to that responsibility
by saying that its "differentiated responsibility" under UNFCCC Article
4(f) allows it to merely curb its emission intensity as a percent of gross
domestic product rather than its emission growth. Emission intensity is
obviously a faulty metric for climate change because the atmosphere does
not expand its absorptive capacity to accommodate whatever economic
growth occurs on the Earth. Of course, the fact that China is in violation of
its obligation to avoid transborder GHG pollution does not itself justify
whatever remedy other countries might want to levy against China. After
all, all countries are violating their own obligations to avoid transborder
GHG pollution, especially the United States, which continues to be the
largest current and historical GHG emitter.
China's position would also seem to violate the two WTO rules
discussed in Part II. First, there is a soft-law obligation that China "should"
act with other countries to protect the environment. Note that this
obligation is in accord with the OECD Guiding Principles-that
governments should seek common standards for polluting products. The
second China violation occurs with the hard-law, WTO duty of China to
protect the life and health of its people.62 By refusing to cooperate with
other countries on agreeing to binding emissions reduction commitments,
China is violating the environmental law of the WTO.
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C. Broader Issues
Having discussed subsidies and carbon charges, let me briefly discuss
some broader issues in the interstices of the House bill. First, giving an
exporter a rebate of an emission allowance would violate the Polluter-Pays
Principle as articulated in Paragraphs 4 and 11 of the Guiding Principles.
Second, excluding agriculture or other major GHG-emitting sectors from
national climate legislation would violate Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
and the WTO duty to protect life and health. Third, a multilaterally-agreed
upon carbon charge against scofflaw countries would not be subject to the
same normative criticism as a unilateral measure. Fourth, environmental
principles do not dictate any answer to whether the producing or the
consuming country should be liable for GHG emissions arising in the
production of goods in transborder trade. It should be noted that in the
62. See Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 25.
63. Accord Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 17, at princ. 7
(calling on States "to conserve, protect, and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem").
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House bill, the cost of an auctioned emission allowance (or an emission
allowance to be purchased by an importer) is not calculated to approximate
the cost "to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state," as
required by the Polluter-Pays Principle.64 Rather, the cost is set in the
market as a function of the supply of government issued allowances, the
demand for them, and the generosity of domestic or international offset
programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this project was to provide a counterweight to the
extensive literature that analyzes climate measures from the perspective of
international trade rules. By contrast, the approach taken in this article is to
examine trade-related climate measures from the perspective of
international environmental law and principles. As discussed in Part II, we
cast the net wide to look at binding and non-binding norms. We also
looked at environmental norms from the WTO recognizing that many
organizations are part of the environment regime.
As explained in Part I, policymakers in all countries are sensitive to
avoiding climate measures that adversely affect national competitiveness.
Whether or not that concern is an economically valid one, this article
reaches the conclusion that granting subsidies, such as free emission
allowances, can be an appropriate instrument under international
environmental law and principles. On the other hand, the article points out
that utilizing border measures, such as carbon charges, is not an appropriate
instrument under environmental law for the purpose of sustaining
competitiveness.
Part I also explains that policymakers want to secure an effective and
coherent climate regime that achieves sufficient emission reduction to avoid
catastrophic climate change. Although the true coherence challenge is the
unwillingness of major emitting countries (for example, the United States)
to take binding obligations, governments are seen to have been reluctant to
make that argument forcefully. Instead, the rhetoric of climate
policymaking is that "leakage" is to be avoided, meaning with leakage
being only the minor dilution of emission reductions in industrial countries
that occur due to the movement of investment from industrial to developing
countries as a result of the higher costs from climate legislation. This
leakage fiction distracts attention from the real problems of international
cooperation. Thus, as a measure to combat "leakage," carbon charges are
too much to achieve too little.
64. Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, supra note 38, art.
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As designed in the House bill, carbon charges would violate many
legal norms and principles of environmental law as discussed in Part III.
Policymakers need also recognize that the core idea of subjecting foreign
polluters to requirements equal to what domestic polluters are subjected to
for equivalent pollution is justifiable under the non-binding OECD
Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution. If a well-designed, non-
discriminatory program of carbon charges were challenged in the WTO, a
panel would have the opportunity to take into account not only the
applicable WTO law, but also the relevant international environmental law
and principles discussed here.
